NEW LENDING FOR A NEW ECONOMY

by Lawrence H. Summers

Lend It Conference, New York City

April 15, 2015

As delivered

It is a great privilege to be here, and I have to say, the size of this crowd, the entrepreneurial energy in this room, the extent of the dialogues and the deals being cut in these corridors gives me hope for the future of the lending industry, gives me hope for the renewal of the American financial industry, and gives me hope for the future of our economy, and the global economy.  And that is even without mentioning, Peter, my gratitude for having been introduced without the usual economist joke.  It was not so long ago that I was introduced by the guy who said, Larry, do you know what it takes to succeed as an economist?  And I said, no.  And he said, an economist is someone who’s pretty good with figures, but does not quite have the personality to be an accountant.  That was in Moscow and no one got the joke.

Here’s what I’d like to do today:  I’d like to talk to you about why I think this is a challenging time for the American economy, talk to you about why I think the conventional financial sector has, in important respects, let all its main constituents down over the last generation, talk to you about how I believe technology-based businesses have the opportunity to transform finance over the next generation, and reflect with you on the principles that should guide public policy with respect to the sector going forward.

This is a challenging time for the economy:

The American economy, at one level, we can take great satisfaction.  I can tell you I was there, that if you looked at any important economic statistic between the Fall of 2008 and the Spring of 2009, GDP, industrial production, unemployment, anything, it was worse than it had been after the fall of 1929.  The trend was faster and further down than it had been after the fall of 1929.  Depression was a real possibility.  Thanks to a combination of the vitality of the American economy and the policies that were put in place, we have not seen anything like a depression.

On the other hand, on the other hand, one has to look with very considerable concern at what has happened to the economy.  Today, the GDP of the United States is about 10 percent, or $1.6 trillion less than people expected it to be in 2015, as of 2007.  That $1.6 trillion lost represents about $20,000 for the average family of four, and that loss is taking place each year, and that loss is taking place against a backdrop of a United States that is doing relatively well compared to the global economy and particularly to the economy of the rest of the industrialized world.

If you look at markets, something quite remarkable is the case.  In Europe, the 10-year interest rate in Germany is 18 basis points.  In Japan, it is comfortably below 50 basis points.  In the United States, it is below two percent, and if you look at real interest rates, that is, interest rates adjusted for inflation, they are negative in Europe and Japan and about 20 basis points in the United States for a 10-year period.

What does that tell us?  All of that sloshing, all of that money, sloshing into government bonds, to the point where their yield is negative, is telling us that, despite all the opportunities that exist in the modern world, markets are seeing some kind of chronic excess of saving that is not being effectively channeled into investment. That failure means less investment, which means less growth, and that lower growth, in turn, means more pessimistic expectations.

THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN A MODERN ECONOMY:

What is the function of the financial system in a modern economy?  The function of a financial system is to connect those who want to put off consumption, whether it is for a rainy day, to send a child to college, to accumulate wealth, to build a house, to prepare for retirement, or to look out for one’s children.  It is to take those who wish to defer consumption and save and, in order those, in order to put those resources to good use among the large number of people who should have good use for resources such as living in a house before they’ve accumulated the wealth equal to the value of the house, putting in place necessary public infrastructure, or doing productive investment that raises the productivity of large number of workers.

It is the task of the financial system to make that connection, and if what we see is that that connection is not being made – then we are seeing lower levels of investment, lower levels of interest rates – that has to raise a question as to how well the mainstream financial system is functioning.

But one can raise a question about how well the mainstream financial system is functioning in a more direct set of ways:  Is it meeting the needs of borrowers?

Well, small business lending is a much smaller fraction of total bank lending than it was 15 years ago, and small businesses, not just in the United States, but in most parts of the industrialized world, report themselves to still be experiencing a credit crunch.

Home ownership rates in the United States have fallen behind by a generation.  It is appropriate and right that credit is not nearly as available for mortgages as it was in 2005 or 2006 or 2004.  It might be appropriate and right that it’s not as available as it was in the early 2000s.  It is, surely, not appropriate that credit is not nearly as available for middle class potential homeowners, as it was in the late 1990s.  It is not appropriate that private equity firms are reaping huge profits by renting homes to homeowners who cannot get mortgage credit and charging them rent that equals eight or 10 percent of the value of those properties.  It could be that those people could be paying three, or four, or five percent of the value of those properties and enjoying the appreciation, as well, if our financial system was doing a better job of providing credit.

Credit is increasingly unavailable for those wishing to pursue higher education because of the great difficulties that the mainstream system has had in distinguishing better from worse risks.  Renaud Laplanche famously got the inspiration to start Lending Club by asking himself, why it was, in the modern technology age, that if he put money in the bank, he got two percent, and if he tried to take money, he tried to borrow money from the bank on his credit card, he paid 17 percent, and this was in the era of computers.   Since Renaud Laplanche had that insight, spreads, administers of costs in mainstream banks have risen not fallen.

So, the first disappointing aspect of the mainstream financial system is that it has not succeeded and is succeeding less well than it once did in its basic function of providing credit to people.

The second respect in which the mainstream financial system has let us down is that if you look over a long period of time, the returns earned by investors in large, mainstream financial institutions, have fallen way short of market returns.  For a number of investors, for those who invested 10 years ago or 20 years ago on a long-term buy-and-hold basis, in a number of institutions that we can all name, the return has been negative 100 percent because they lost all their money.  Those who invested in a number of other institutions that still function on a large scale today, have lost more than 80 percent of their money, given the losses and the dilution associated with the financial crisis.  On average, returns have fallen far, far short of the S&P 500.

So, the financial system hasn’t worked so well for the benefit of its customers.  Borrowing is hard.  It isn’t working so well for the benefit of its creditors.  You don’t earn any money anymore when you deposit money in a bank, and it hasn’t worked so well for the benefit of its, and it hasn’t, and it hasn’t worked so well for the benefit of its share owners, either.

It also hasn’t worked so well for the rest of us.  Think about the last long generation.  We saw the Latin American debt crisis that brought the major financial institutions to the brink.  We saw the 1987 stock market crash.  We saw the S&L debacle.  We saw the New York City real estate crash.  We saw the 1994-1995 Mexican financial collapse.  We saw the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  We saw the 1998 LTCM Russia episode.  We saw the 2000 Internet bubble.  We saw the 2001-2002 Enron long-term high yield bond debacle, and all of that was a prelude.

It is high time for reflection on the renewal of the financial system and the creation of a financial system that will work more viably for savers and borrowers, and will work more viably for the benefit of the economy.  Some substantial part of that effort involves public policy.  It involves government regulation.  It involves the kinds of issues that people dealt with in Dodd-Frank.  It involves thinking about too big to fail.  It involves capital requirements.  It involves thinking about resolution regimes, and the like.  That is not my topic today.

TECHNOLOGY-BASED BUSINESSES HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSFROM FINANCE:

Some other very substantial part of the solution to that problem, to the renewal of finance around benefiting people rather than benefiting money lies in technological innovation and its application.  Because if you think about it, finance is an information-intensive business.  It’s all about information, and we are living through an extraordinary period of information technology innovation.

My Smartphone right here – this device costs about $500.  It has more computing power than the Apollo project did that sent a man to the moon.   It has more accessibility of information. If you have this device, than you have access to all of the Harvard libraries.  I work at Harvard.  If you gave me my choice – no Smartphone and free access to the Harvard libraries 24 hours a day or full access to my Smartphone, but no longer any access to the Harvard libraries, that would not be a hard choice.

And if you think about the ability to be in touch and connect with people around the world, you would rather have this device than have the White House communication system as it stood when John F. Kennedy was President of the United States.

And here’s the remarkable thing:  there will be a date; it might be three years from now, it might be seven years from now, but it won’t be 10 years from now, when there will be more Smartphones on Earth than there are adults.  Now, admittedly, that’s, in part, because there’s going to be some people in Hong Kong who have four, but we are not far from the day when almost everyone on Earth will have a Smartphone.

That is a moment of extraordinary potential for information technology innovation.  We do not know and we cannot forecast all the forms that it will take.  There was a very good book, or at least at the time it was thought to be a very good book, that was written by a Harvard colleague of mine and a MIT professor, in 2004, and it was an attempt to look very carefully and very thoughtfully at what technology could do, but what would still be the domain of the human brain, and what it would be a long time before technology could replace, and they chose a canonical example of something that was easy for humans but hard for technology.  That canonical example was making a left turn in the face of oncoming traffic.  Google solved that problem within five years after those sentences were written.

We do not yet know all that technology will be able to do.  We do know this, and it’s a good law for thinking about the world, whether you’re thinking about the arrival of financial crises or you’re thinking about the dissemination of technologies, we know that things take longer to happen than you think they will and then they happen faster than you thought they could.  That’s the way it was with the housing bubble collapsing.  That’s the way it was with the pervasiveness of the personal computer.  That’s the way it was with the Internet becoming part of the fabric of all of our daily lives, and that will be the way it is with respect to the next set of innovations.

So, as a general proposition, I would suggest to you that technology has immense potential.  And I would suggest to you that it is an oddity, that until quite recently technology has not been disruptive of mainstream finance.  Yes, there have been huge amounts of financial innovation, derivatives, different kinds of derivatives, whatever, but they have been more for the benefit of money than they have been for the benefit of people.  Paul Volcker was not exaggerating very much, if he was exaggerating at all, when he said four or five years ago that there hasn’t been an important financial innovation since the ATM.

I joined the Lending Club board because I believe that the thrust and the strain that is represented by all of you in this room, the application of information technology, to take frictions out and make finance work better, and, in particular, though this is not the only sphere where this is important, to do so with respect to lending, I believe, has the potential to, over time, be transformative of the financial system and to address its infirmities that I described a few moments ago.

What were those infirmities?  Frictions that were too large, that represented too large a gap between what savers receive and what borrowers pay.  Banking without banks can take three percent, five percent, six percent out of the cost of intermediation. Taking the friction cost out is profoundly making finance better, but that is only one of the benefits.  A second benefit is that the systematic use of data on a large scale will permit better credit judgments, and that will permit the more accurate allocation of capital.  The more accurate allocation of capital means higher returns, which is good for the providers of capital.  It means that capital will be available to the previously unrecognized creditworthy.  It means that those who are creditworthy, but have not yet been able to prove themselves to be creditworthy, will now be given opportunities to prove themselves to be creditworthy and enter the mainstream and see their borrowing costs decline over time.  It means that capital will be allocated more wisely, which means that there will be more efficiency in its use, which, ultimately means more jobs and better products throughout the economy.

Some of that’s going to come from better use of existing data.  Some of that will come from harnessing data streams that were previously available.  I’m privileged to serve also on the board of Square.  Square has an important new product, Square Capital, that lends to small business but with the informational and enforcement advantages that come from handling all of their credit card processing, which permits them to make much lower cost loans available, and to make decisions more rapidly.

The use of technology has a third major benefit.  It provides a much more satisfactory kind of consumer experience.  We live in a society because of all the ways in which we are conditioned, when all of us are less patient than we would have been a generation ago.  One manifestation of that is that if you watch the evening news, the average film clip of somebody being interviewed is now eight seconds.  In 1968, it was a minute and eight seconds.  Well, that growing impatience means that if we apply for a loan, we want to know the answer, yes or no, now, not yes or no in the mail three weeks from now.  We want to interact with institutions who don’t ask for our trust, but earn our trust through the efficiency with which they deal with us.  And if you look at the performance scores of firms like Lending Club, in contrast to the favorability ratings from consumers of large banks, it is an ocean of difference.

And so these models offer a better consumer experience, more informed allocation of credit, substantially reduced frictions, and I believe they have the opportunity also to contribute to greater financial stability in our economy.  They have the ability to contribute to greater financial stability in several ways.

First, the basic lesson of this field of ecology; a lot of things you learn in the field of ecology, but if there’s one take-home less from ecology it is this:  Diverse ecosystems are much more resilient than beautiful ecosystems.  A financial system in which credit is provided by banks, credit is provided through traditional capital markets, credit is provided through platform lenders, and credit is provided through specialty finance vehicles supported by information technology – a financial system that is more diverse – will be a financial system that is more stable.  It is a financial system that will be more free of the positive feedback loops that happen when credit contracts and, therefore, asset values decline, and, therefore, credit contracts, and, therefore, asset values decline, and it happens again and again.

If we can have more resilience in the basic provision of credit through more diversity, we can have a more stable financial system.  Platform lending doesn’t have the central connection to leverage that traditional banking does.  There is no entity that carries a balance sheet with leverage.  There’s nothing there that is too big to fail.  There is nothing there that requires deposit insurance.  There is nothing there that is implicitly subsidized, and there is, therefore, a greater contribution to stability, to the kind of stability that we seek to achieve.  And better information technology and better credit decisions mean less risk of failure and that, too, is a contributor to stability.

So, I believe that the financial system, traditional financial system, given its performance, is ripe for disruption.  I believe that it is more than most sectors the moment for disruption, given success and informational technology, and I believe that the nature of the incipient disruption, the use of information technology to lend in new ways, is directly responsive to the problems that have caused such dissatisfaction with the financial system over the last generation, and that have contributed to our economic problems, and those slow growth forecasts, and those remarkably low interest rates.

FIRST PRINCIPLES THAT CAN GUIDE PUBLIC POLICY FOR NEW LENDING:

How should public policy view all of this? I would suggest four precepts.  It will not resolve every specific regulatory question, but I think if we are able to follow these four precepts, the future can be very bright, both for entrepreneurs and for almost everybody because almost everybody is a stakeholder, one way or another, in the success of our financial system.

What are those precepts?

First, permission not prohibition.  Let new business models emerge.  Regulators should allow new firms to operate, generate data on the outcomes created by novel business models before writing new rules.  Yes, regulation is necessary, but only when it is necessary.

I was privileged to serve as Secretary of the Treasury, and in the Treasury Department, under President Bill Clinton.  One of the much less remarked, but I think more important, developments during his Administration was the decision in the mid-1990s to establish a presumption of permission with respect to the Internet.  It was not, at that moment, entirely obvious what the right approach was to this new technology, and the decision that President Clinton made, advised, ironically, by Ira Magaziner, who had earlier been an advocate of a very substantially regulated healthcare system.  The decision was, yes, we will be vigilant with respect to privacy.  Yes, we will be vigilant with respect to monopoly.  Yes, we will be vigilant with respect to national security, but that the presumption would be of permission, rather than a presumption of prohibition, and I believe that is hugely important with respect to new information technology, businesses generally, and it is important, in particular, with respect to lending business.

Second principle:  Insist on transparency and disclosure, then let consumers decide.  As new lenders serve parts of the market that have historically not had access to credit, high rates may draw regulatory scrutiny.  Regulators should require full transparency and disclosure, and see how consumers react to new products and prices before writing rules.  Make no mistake, I am not arguing for laissez-faire.  Make no mistake, there have been multiple instances in the past of financial innovation, in which consumers were substantially exploited.  We saw that with respect to a number of the innovations in mortgage finance just a dozen years ago, but, but we need, also, to recognize that people are not going to improve their credit without getting credit.  That when they get credit, they have the opportunity to improve their credit, and we need to allow those with new business models, seeking to reach new populations, an opportunity to show what they can do, as long as they do it with full transparency and full honesty.

Third principle:  Maintain a level playing field.  Don’t give incumbents an unfair advantage, but discourage business models based on unfair regulatory arbitrage.  Regulators should strive to put entrants on equal footing with incumbents, but to do so without sacrificing consumer protection.  No lending business, on-line or off-line, should get a pass on usury laws, on fair lending requirements, on disclosure, or on other critical safeguards.  At the same time, the choice to operate in non-traditional form should not mean an exemption from principles that have been regarded as appropriate to apply to all lending.

It is essential that requirements that are not longer appropriate, like the requirements for the monitoring of the balance sheet of banks, are not enforced on institutions that do not have balance sheets, but serve only as platforms.

Fourth principle:  provide workable regulatory frameworks.  To date, regulatory authorities have generally maintained appropriate attitudes towards innovative lenders.  It will be important as the industry evolves and grows that regulators not create overhangs of uncertainty or burden excessively those attempting to innovate.

If we can adopt these precepts and other related precepts, I believe that the next decade can be a period of unprecedented financial innovation in lending businesses.  That innovation can be a source of entrepreneurial innovation for those in this room and many, many beyond.  That, more importantly, it can mean that the basic function of a financial system to provide higher returns to savers, lower costs to borrowers, while permitting investments that drive the economy forward can be performed better in the future than it has been in the past.

Innovation in lending, payments, funding, and allocation of risk, I believe, offers tremendous potential for making the American economy and the global economy not just more efficient, but more secure and more stable. And when I think about the magnitude of the problems, and they are many, and I think about what I had a chance to see somewhat closely – the tendency towards dysfunction, the occasional ossification of tradition in Washington – I know that while the right public policies are hugely important, that the task of renewal of our financial system is not primarily one for public policy.  It is primarily one for entrepreneurial innovation, and that is why the size and growth of the LendIt conference seems, to me, to be so positive a sign for our future, and I am so very glad to have had the opportunity to address you.

Thank you very much.

New Lending For A New Economy

On April 15, 2015 at the LendIt Conference in NYC, Summers explained how new lending models can play a critical role in growing the economy and detailed his views on how regulators should approach the new sector. Summers made the case for how financial innovation in lending is serving broad social objectives and laid out first principles for how policymakers should view marketplace lending. Read more

Pre-emptive wars on inflation big mistake

Summers talked with Joe Kernen from CNBC’s Squawk Box on Thursday, April 9, 2015 saying, “Pre-emptive wars don’t work and  pre-emptive wars on inflation would be a big mistake.”  Summers also told Kernen, “We need to be all over the inflation data.” Read more

Time US leadership woke up to new economic era

April 5, 2015

This past month may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system. True, there have been any number of periods of frustration for the US before, and times when American behaviour was hardly multilateralist, such as the 1971 Nixon shock, ending the convertibility of the dollar into gold. But I can think of no event since Bretton Woods comparable to the combination of China’s effort to establish a major new institution and the failure of the US to persuade dozens of its traditional allies, starting with Britain, to stay out of it.

This failure of strategy and tactics was a long time coming, and it should lead to a comprehensive review of the US approach to global economics. With China’s economic size rivalling America’s and emerging markets accounting for at least half of world output, the global economic architecture needs substantial adjustment. Political pressures from all sides in the US have rendered it increasingly dysfunctional.

Largely because of resistance from the right, the US stands alone in the world in failing to approve the International Monetary Fund governance reforms that Washington itself pushed for in 2009. By supplementing IMF resources, this change would have bolstered confidence in the global economy. More important, it would come closer to giving countries such as China and India a share of IMF votes commensurate with their new economic heft.

Meanwhile, pressures from the left have led to pervasive restrictions on infrastructure projects financed through existing development banks, which consequently have receded as funders, even as many developing countries now see infrastructure finance as their principle external funding need.

With US commitments unhonoured and US-backed policies blocking the kinds of finance other countries want to provide or receive through the existing institutions, the way was clear for China to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. There is room for argument about the tactical approach that should have been taken once the initiative was put forward. But the larger question now is one of strategy. Here are three precepts that US leaders should keep in mind.

First, American leadership must have a bipartisan foundation at home, be free from gross hypocrisy and be restrained in the pursuit of self-interest. As long as one of our major parties is opposed to essentially all trade agreements, and the other is resistant to funding international organisations, the US will not be in a position to shape the global economic system.

Other countries are legitimately frustrated when US officials ask them to adjust their policies — then insist that American state regulators, independent agencies and far-reaching judicial actions are beyond their control. This is especially true when many foreign businesses assert that US actions raise real rule of law problems.

The legitimacy of US leadership depends on our resisting the temptation to abuse it in pursuit of parochial interest, even when that interest appears compelling. We cannot expect to maintain the dollar’s primary role in the international system if we are too aggressive about limiting its use in pursuit of particular security objectives.

Second, in global as well as domestic politics, the middle class counts the most. It sometimes seems that the prevailing global agenda combines elite concerns about matters such as intellectual property, investment protection and regulatory harmonisation with moral concerns about global poverty and posterity, while offering little to those in the middle. Approaches that do not serve the working class in industrial countries (and rising urban populations in developing ones) are unlikely to work out well in the long run.

Third, we may be headed into a world where capital is abundant and deflationary pressures are substantial. Demand could be in short supply for some time. In no big industrialised country do markets expect real interest rates to be much above zero in 2020 or inflation targets to be achieved. In the future, the priority must be promoting investment, not imposing austerity. The present system places the onus of adjustment on “borrowing” countries. The world now requires a symmetric system, with pressure also placed on “surplus” countries.

These precepts are just a beginning, and many questions remain. There are questions about global public goods, about acting with the speed and clarity that the current era requires, about co-operation between governmental and non-governmental actors, and much more. What is crucial is that the events of the past month will be seen by future historians not as the end of an era, but as a salutary wake up call.

The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary

 

On Secular Stagnation: A Response to Bernanke

Ben Bernanke has inaugurated his blog with a set of thoughtful observations on the determinants of real interest rates (see his post here) and the secular stagnation hypothesis that I have invoked in an effort to understand recent macroeconomic developments.  I agree with much of what Ben writes and would highlight in particular his recognition that the Fed is in a sense a follower rather than a leader with respect to real interest rates –  since they are determined by broad factors bearing on the supply and demand for capital – and his recognition that equilibrium real rates appear to have been trending downward for quite some time.  His challenges to the secular stagnation hypothesis have helped me clarify my thinking and provide an opportunity to address a number of points where I think there has been some confusion in the public debate. Read more

Increasing Education: What it will and will not do for earnings inequality

In a paper published by the Hamilton Project on March 30, 2015, Brad Hershbein, Melissa S. Kearney, and Lawrence H. Summers analyzed what increasing education will and will not do for earnings and earnings inequality. Mainstream labor economists as well as several public commentators have argued that trends in the economy over recent decades—including technological developments, globalization, and trade, among others—have weakened the relative earnings power of those with lower levels of skills, especially those without a college degree. Read more

Thought Economics: Modern Capitalism

In an exclusive interview with Prof. Summers and Prof. Edmund Phelps, Thought Economics looks at the story of modern capitalism, the benefits it has brought, and the challenges it has created. The series explores the ‘post crisis’ economy, the role of government in society, the relationship between capitalism, conflict and inequality and looks at what needs to be done to ‘fix’ our global economy, and the science of economics itself. Read more

A deal worth getting right

March 8, 2015

Over the next few months, the question of U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal is likely to be resolved one way or the other. It is, to put it mildly, a highly controversial issue. Proponents believe a deal is essential to both our economic and geopolitical interests; opponents fear that it will primarily benefit corporations and the wealthy at the expense of middle-class living standards.

Definitive judgement is not possible because the parties are still negotiating and we have not yet seen a final agreement. Our negotiators should never forget that those who “need” agreements get less-good ones than those who do not. The U.S. economy is certainly capable of prospering without a deal. And lack of global profit opportunities for corporations headquartered in the United States is not one of our economy’s most pressing problems. Nonetheless, I believe that the right TPP deal is very much in the U.S. national interest.

First, in considering what is most fundamental — the interests of American workers — it is essential to distinguish between the effects of trade and the effects of trade agreements. The combination of changing patterns of trade, in which more activity takes place with low-wage economies, and new research has altered economic thinking on trade. The consensus view now is that trade and globalization have meaningfully increased inequality in the United States by allowing more earning opportunities for those at the top and exposing ordinary workers to more competition, especially in manufacturing.

But increases in the extent of U.S. trade are driven largely by technology and by the increased sophistication of developing economies, not by trade agreements. The United States, for example, has had no new trade agreements or arrangements with India for 20 years. Yet the dollar volume of trade between the two countries has increased ninefold.

Arrangements such as the TPP have the potential to tilt the gains from trade toward the American middle class. This is due to the fact that the United States has been a very open market for a long time. This means that properly negotiated trade agreements bring down foreign barriers and promote exports to a much greater extent than they reduce U.S. barriers and benefit imports. They also reduce pressure for outsourcing because when barriers fall the incentive to invest abroad in order to avoid paying tariffs is attenuated.

Crucially, the TPP is necessary to allow U.S. producers to compete on a level playing field, given the proliferation of arrangements that do not include the United States. Currently, for example, Japanese and Southeast Asian producers get better terms in each other’s markets than does the United States. Only through the TPP do we have the chance to manage international competition in ways that can benefit U.S. workers through binding arrangements in areas such as labor and environmental standards.

So the TPP should be judged not against the hypothetical past in which U.S. workers did not face foreign competition but in the context of a world in which trade integration in Asia is already happening — with or without the United States. Its merit will depend on U.S. negotiating priorities.

Some matters pushed by the business community have little or nothing to do with the interests of the vast majority of U.S. workers and should not be emphasized. These include pressuring other countries to change health and safety regulations, extend and strengthen patent protections and deregulate financial services. In these areas, on grounds of fairness, it is reasonable for us to strive for the principle of national treatment — no discrimination against foreign firms — but not to use inherently scarce negotiating power to alter other countries’ basic choices.

Conversely, it is appropriate in the TPP talks, and our international economic diplomacy more generally, for us to use the substantial leverage we possess in areas that do bear directly on middle-class living standards. These include the prevention of inappropriate producer subsidies — including through manipulated exchange rates or distorted state enterprise accounting — and, more generally, cooperation to ensure that a world in which the greater mobility of capital and companies does not become one in which governments lose the ability to protect their citizens. If global integration means local disintegration, it will be a failure.

Any international agreement must be judged not just against our aspirations, but also against our alternatives. No plausible TPP deal will achieve all that we want. But it should be possible to negotiate an agreement that is much better than the alternative of growing trade shaped only by agreements that exclude the United States. I hope and expect that when it is presented for approval, the TPP will meet this test.

The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary

Establishment Populism Rising

Thomas Edsall
New York Times
March 4, 2015

Larry Summers, who withdrew his candidacy for the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve under pressure from the liberal wing of the Democratic Party in 2013, has emerged as the party’s dominant economic policy strategist. The former Treasury secretary’s evolving message has won over many of his former critics.

Summers’s ascendance is a reflection of the abandonment by much of the party establishment of neo-liberal thinking, premised on the belief that unregulated markets and global trade would produce growth beneficial to worker and C.E.O. alike.
Summers’s analysis of current economic conditions suggests that free market capitalism, as now structured, is producing major distortions. These distortions, in his view, have resulted in gains of $1 trillion annually to those at the top of the pyramid, and losses of $1 trillion every year to those in the bottom 80 percent.

At a Feb. 19 panel discussion on the future of work organized by the Hamilton Project, a centrist Democratic think tank, Summers defied economic orthodoxy. He dismissed as “whistling past the graveyard” the widely accepted view that improving education and job training is the most effective way to reduce joblessness.

“The core problem,” according to Summers, is that there aren’t enough jobs, and if you help some people, you can help them get the jobs, but then someone else won’t get the jobs. And unless you’re doing things that are affecting the demand for jobs, you’re helping people win a race to get a finite number of jobs, and there are only so many of them.
He adds that he is “all for” more schooling and job training, but as an answer to the problems of the job marketplace, “it is fundamentally an evasion.”

This line of thought has strong appeal to liberal economists and policy makers who argue that government must intervene to create more demand for workers, primarily by spending more, especially spending that goes to private contractors who would then start hiring.

Summers dismissed as palliative such relatively modest proposals as supplementing the earnings of low-wage workers by increasing the earned-income tax credit and expanding eligibility for the refundable credit.
Even a 50 percent increase in the earned-income tax credit at a cost of $25 billion would barely address current income inequality, Summers said.According to Summers:

If we had the same income distribution in the United States that we did in 1979, the top 1 percent would have $1 trillion less today [in annual income], and the bottom 80 percent would have $1 trillion more. That works out to about $700,000 [a year for] for a family in the top 1 percent, and works out to about $11,000 a year for a family in the bottom 80 percent.
The lion’s share of the income of the top 1 percent is concentrated in the top 0.1 percent and 0.01 percent. The average income of the top 1 percent in 2013, according to data provided by Emmanuel Saez, a Berkeley economist, was $1.2 million, for the top 0.1 percent, $5.3 million, and for the top 0.01 percent, $24.9 million.

In other words, any attempt to correct the contemporary pattern in income distribution would require large and controversial changes in tax policy, regulation of the workplace, and intervention in the economy to expand employment and to raise wages.
To counter the weak employment market, Summers called for major growth in government expenditures to fill needs that the private sector is not addressing:

In our society, whether it is taking care of the young or taking care of the old, or repairing a lot that needs to be repaired, there is a huge amount of very valuable work that needs to be done. It’s much less clear, to use a modern phrase, that there’s a viable business model for getting it done. And I guess the reason why I think there is going to need to be a lot of reflection on the role of government going forward is that, if I’m right, that there’s vitally important work to be done for which there is no standard capital business model that will get it done. That suggests important roles for public policy.

Earlier this year, Summers co-wrote the Report of the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity, a forceful set of economic proposals released on Jan. 15 by the Center for American Progress.

In order to stem the disproportionate share of income flowing to corporate managers and owners of capital, and to address the declining share going to workers, the report calls for tax and regulatory policies to encourageemployee ownership, the strengthening of collective bargaining rights, regulations requiring corporations to provide fringe benefits to employees working for subcontractors, a substantial increase in the minimum wage, sharper overtime pay enforcement, and a huge increase in infrastructure appropriations – for roads, bridges, ports, schools – to spur job creation and tighten the labor market.
Summers also calls for significant increases in the progressivity of the United States tax system. He would eliminate or modify many of the tax breaks that now provide most of their benefits to the affluent, including the conversion of the mortgage interest deduction into a credit. “While deductions deliver a larger benefit to tax payers in higher tax brackets, credits deliver the same benefits to all tax payers, making the tax code more progressive,” the report notes. In addition, the report presses for much tougher rules governing the taxation of corporate overseas income.

I spoke with Summers on the phone last week to get more details about his thinking. One of his central goals, he said, is to make sure that “workers get a larger share of the pie.” He advocates aggressive steps to eliminate “rents” — profits that result from monopoly or other forms of government protection from competition. Summers favors attacking rents in the form of “exclusionary zoning practices” that bid up the price of housing, “excessively long copyright” protections, and financial regulations“providing implicit subsidies to a fortunate minority.”

Signaling that he now finds himself on common ground with stalwarts of the Democratic left like Elizabeth Warren and Joe Stiglitz, Summers adds, “Government needs to try to make sure everyone can get access to financial markets on an equal basis.”

Along with a growing number of Democratic policy advocates, Summers supports looking past income inequality to the distribution of wealth. During our conversation, he pointed out that “a large fraction of capital gains escapes taxation entirely” through “the stepped up basis at death.”Stepped up basis refers to an I.R.S. provision reducing the capital gains tax liability on inherited assets so that the beneficiary’s capital gains tax is minimized. Revenue losses from the stepped up basis amounted, in the 2014 fiscal year, to $36.4 billion according to the Office of Management and Budget.
Summers’s policy proposals have been praised by former critics.

Asked for his assessment of Summers’s views, Lawrence Mishel, president of the liberal, pro-labor Economic Policy Institute, emailed “I very much appreciate that Larry Summers has recently highlighted the need for a ‘high pressure economy’ and the need to ‘expand worker bargaining power.’ ”

Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, which sponsors the work of liberal economists, replied to my inquiry: “It’s funny you would ask this. I was just writing something praising Summers and others for changing their thinking.”

In his not-yet-published pro-Summers essay, Baker writes:
The idea that an economy could suffer from a persistent shortage of demand is an enormous switch for Summers or anyone who had been adhering to the economic orthodoxy in the three decades prior to the crisis in 2008. Baker goes on to argue that Summers “now recognizes that the financial system needs serious regulation.”

Some economists disagree with Summers. David Autor, a professor of economics at M.I.T., wrote in an email that Summers seems
to presuppose that we have entered an era of secular stagnation with perennially insufficient demand. I don’t share this pessimism, and I think many indicators point in the right direction: employment growth, wage trends, inflation, energy prices, even inequality.

In a follow-up email, Summers took note of Dean Baker’s assertion that Summers had changed his views, replying that John Maynard Keynes
is said to have responded to a similar question by saying ‘when the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do sir?’ Much has changed since the 1990s, including protracted shortfalls in demand, a dramatic decline in labor’s share of income, the pulling away of the top 1 percent, the possible emergence of secular stagnation, and the financial crisis. So of course my policy views have evolved.

Summers has advised Hillary Clinton on economic issues, and a key question looking toward 2016 is how much of the Summers agenda she is prepared to adopt, if she decides to run for president.

Many of the policies outlined by Summers — especially on trade, taxation, financial regulation and worker empowerment — are the very policies that divide the Wall-Street-corporate wing from the working-to-middle-class wing of the Democratic Party. Put another way, these policies divide the money wing from the voting wing.

Summers has forced out in the open a set of choices that Hillary Clinton has so far avoided, choices that even if she attempts to elide them will amount to a signal of where her loyalties lie.

Wal-Mart, Starbucks, Aetna’s pay hikes: Why now?

Robots are hurting middle class workers

In an March 3, 2015 article in The Washington Post’s Wonkblog Summers talked about technology, inequality and education. Summers reaffirmed the idea that more education won’t solve the inequality problem and called technological change an important fuel for the rising economic share captured by the top 1 percent of American earners.
Read more

Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean

Summers’ “Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean” NBER Working Paper co-authored with Lant Pritchett, was featured in NBER’s March Digest. The paper demonstrates that typical degrees of regression to the mean imply substantial slowdowns in China and India relative even to currently cautious forecasts. Read more

Reflections on Secular Stagnation

Summers gave the keynote address at Princeton University’s Julius-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy & Finance on February 19, 2015. In his remarks, Summers gave his perspective on the “profound macroeconomic challenge of the next 20 years in the industrial world: secular stagnation.” Read more

The Future of Work

Summers participated in a panel, “Future of Work,” hosted by Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institue on February 19, 2015. Summers said, “the idea there are all these jobs and we just need to train people is an evasion of the problem, we need more demand!” Read more

USA Today: Summers on Global Threats

On February 16, 2015, in her column for USA TODAY, Maria Bartiromo talks with Summers about Europe, Russia, Ukraine and and the implications for the global economy. Summers also discusses the U.S. economy, oil prices, the Fed and what Summers is learning from his students. Read more

Why now is not the time to raise rates

Summers appeared on CNBC’s Squawk on the Street on February 12, 2015 to discuss why extraordinary economic conditions require extraordinary measures, and now is not the right time to raise interest rates. Read more

What Business Can Do to Save the Middle Class

In an interview with the Harvard Business Review on February 9, 2015, Summers discusses the work of the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity and why executives and business owners should care about it.  Summers answers questions like, How does corporate governance need to change in your view? Can the private sector create a more inclusive economy or is it up to policymakers to solve the problem? Read more

Only raise US rates when whites of inflation’s eyes are visible

February 8, 2015

Aborting recovery and risking a further slowing of price rises is potentially catastrophic

I cannot recall a moment when the gap between what markets expect the US Federal Reserve to do and what the Fed itself has forecast it will do has been as large. Markets predict that the Fed will raise rates only to 1.6 per cent by the end of 2017; the Federal Open Market Committee’s average forecast is 3.5 per cent.

Such a divergence raises the risk of volatility and poses a communications challenge for the Fed. More important, it raises the question of what should guide future policy.

Especially after Friday’s very strong employment report, there can be no doubt that cyclical conditions are normalising. The unemployment rate now is at its postwar average level, and continues to fall. Job openings are above their historic average. Other indicators such as the insured unemployment rate suggest a normal or rapidly normalising economy. All of this taken in isolation would suggest that interest rates should not remain at zero much longer.

On the other hand, the available inflation data suggests little cause for concern. The core consumer price index has averaged 1.1 per cent over the past six months; if housing costs were stripped out it would be zero. Wages actually fell in December and over the past year employment costs have risen 2.25 per cent which, in conjunction with productivity growth of only 1 per cent, suggests inflation of below 2 per cent. Perhaps most troubling: market indications suggest inflation is more likely to fall than rise .

The Fed has rightly made clear that its decisions will be data dependent. The further key point is that it should allow the flow of information on inflation rather than on real economic activity to determine its timing in adjusting interest rates. And it should not raise rates until there is clear evidence that inflation, and inflation expectations, are in danger of exceeding its 2 per cent target. Here are four important reasons why.

First, real wages for most workers have been stagnant. Median family incomes are down by 4.5 per cent over the past five years and the economy is about $1.5tn — or $20,000 for the average family of four — below pre-recession estimates of its 2015 potential.

In such circumstances efforts to reduce demand and growth require a compelling justification. Yet the idea that below normal unemployment will necessarily lead to accelerating inflation as suggested by the so called Phillips curve is very uncertain. Contrary to such predictions, inflation did not decelerate by much even a few years ago when unemployment was in the range of 10 per cent. Nor was there much evidence of accelerating inflation in the 1990s when the unemployment rate fell below 4 per cent.

Second, if inflation were to accelerate a bit this would be a good thing. It is now running and is expected to run below the Fed target. Prices are about 4 per cent below where they would have been if 2 per cent inflation had been maintained since 2007. So there is a case for some inflation above 2 per cent to catch up to the Fed’s price level target path. There may also be a case for inflation a little bit above 2 per cent for the next few years to allow real interest rates low enough to promote recovery when the next recession comes.

Third, a plane that accelerates too rapidly as it takes off may cause passengers discomfort while a plane that accelerates too slowly may crash at the end of the runway. Historical experience is that inflation accelerates only slowly so the costs of an overshoot on inflation are small and reversible with standard tightening policies. In contrast, aborting recovery and risking a further slowing of inflation is potentially catastrophic — as Japan’s experience demonstrates. So in a world where economic forecasts are highly uncertain, prudence in avoiding the largest risks counsels in favour of Fed restraint in raising rates.

Fourth, the US has never been more intertwined with the global economy. Higher interest rates and the stronger dollar they would bring would mean greater debt burdens for debtor countries, a growing US trade deficit that damages manufacturing, and growing protectionist pressures.

There is already a danger given all the problems in Europe, Japan and emerging markets that safe haven flows will drive the dollar up to the point where the US economy could be significantly slowed. Raising rates without evidence of rising inflation could dramatically increase real rates and exacerbate these risks.

None of this is to say that rates should never be raised or that inflation indicators might not justify a rate increase before long. It is to say that the Fed could inject much needed confidence in the economy today and minimise future risks by announcing and following a strategy of not raising rates until it sees the whites of inflation’s eyes.

The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary

 

Lancet: Can one turn an aspiration into reality?

By Richard Horton

The Lancet Vol. 385 February 7, 2015

The idea of a “grand convergence” in health, achievable
within our lifetimes, might seem a naive idea. Chronic
confl icts, unpredictable humanitarian disasters, and
the persistent fragility of some nation states makes
the notion of ending preventable mortality within a
generation little more than a pipe-dream. But these
ambitious goals have inspired wide support for the core
message of the Commission on Investing in Health,
known also as Global Health 2035 (published in The Lancet
in December, 2013). Why has the central argument of the
Commission, despite its utopian implications, been so
warmly embraced?

Read the full piece: Lancet Editorial on Global Health 2035