Archive for category: Global Economics

The announcement last week that Christine Lagarde would be leaving her post as managing director of the International Monetary Fund to become president of the European Central Bank marks what may be the most important change in the leadership of the international financial system in decades. At a time when the United States is abdicating its systemic responsibilities and focusing only on narrow commercial interests, the role that Lagarde is leaving and the one she is entering are of preeminent importance.

Lagarde — unlike any of the others considered for leadership of the ECB — fits in more naturally with the group of European heads of state who meet regularly in Brussels than with the group of central bank heads who meet in Basel, Switzerland. This is a reflection of her extraordinary presence, political ability and experience with European affairs. It is also a consequence of the fact that, unlike most central bank governors, she is not an economist or experienced financial technocrat.

Lagarde’s strengths are well matched to this moment. The greatest risk to European monetary union and Europe’s contribution to the global economy is the persistence of the belief that the ECB, acting independently, can stabilize the European economy. At the IMF, Lagarde showed a willingness to assert that the austerity doctrines that were appropriate in an inflationary, high-interest-rate era are not appropriate in an era when markets believe central banks will not succeed in getting inflation up to their 2 percent target even over a decade. A focus on going beyond monetary policy in stimulating demand will be essential for the European economy to perform adequately in the years ahead.

In addition to good macroeconomic policy choices, the success of the ECB will require institutional reforms bringing more consolidation in banking regulation and emergency response across Europe and allowing the issuance of debt backed by all of Europe. There are sharp disagreements on these matters within Europe, and so moving forward will require the political stature and agility of someone such as Lagarde, not just technical explanations.

Current ECB President Mario Draghi saved the euro system with his famous promise to “do whatever it takes.” In the future, however, such an assurance may not be enough unless the ECB can also persuade governments to do what is necessary. There is the further consideration that “money only” strategies for supporting the European economy will probably mean a weak euro and exacerbation of global trade friction. So it will be very fortunate that the ECB has strong, politically credible leadership.

What about the IMF that Lagarde leaves behind? The good news is that, under her deft leadership, the IMF has moved a long way from seeming to people around the world to be a stern dispenser of austerity in the interest of financiers to earning trust by taking on a broad range of problems of concern to regular people. In addition to supporting larger deficits and fiscal stimulus when appropriate, the Lagarde IMF has successfully promoted necessary debt relief, cooperation in collecting reasonable levels of tax from global corporations, measures to reduce inequality, and the curtailment of subsidies that promote greenhouse gas emissions.

Lagarde’s successor will need to build on all of this to lead in minimizing the risks of a catastrophic recession. Among other things, this means strengthening financial monitoring as risky private-sector lending rises after years of economic expansion, focusing on national policies that adequately maintain demand, assuring that the IMF has adequate resources to deal with the emerging-market crises that will surely come at some point, and carrying the torch for collaboration in maintaining global trade and international economic cooperation at a time when there is no one else with the capacity and will to take a global view.

Financial-policy leadership has something in common with the administration of anesthesia. It is least noticed when it is done best. But when done badly the consequences can be catastrophic. Between rising populist pressures, liquidity-trap low-interest rates, U.S. abdication of leadership and an expansion that is aging, this is a perilous moment that will require confident and competent financial leadership. We must all hope that Christine Lagarde at the ECB and whoever is chosen as her successor at the IMF will provide.

Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping reached an agreement over the weekend at the Group of 20 meeting in Argentina on a framework for trade dialogue that will delay the imposition of new American tariffs. While surely better than the alternative, this step does not address any of the fundamental tensions in the economic relationship between the United States and China.

Few observers doubt that China needs to make significant changes in areas such as intellectual property, the rights of foreign investors and subsidies to state-owned companies if it is to meet international norms. Antipathy toward Chinese economic practices is hardly confined to Trump. Recent months have witnessed attacks on the existing economic relationship from members of previous U.S. administrations, noted China experts and the American business community. Indeed, it can be fairly said there are no China accommodationists left in Washington. When foreign governments get past their frustrations with the Trump administration, they acknowledge that they, too, are frustrated with Chinese commercial practices.

Yet it is also easy to sympathize with Chinese leaders who insist that China’s political system is for it to choose, and that economic negotiations should focus on the pragmatic identification of win-win opportunities, rather than on questions of ideology. At the same time, it is hard to see how anyone with a modicum of historical knowledge could fail to be concerned by a combination of increased domestic repression, centralization of power in one man, rapidly increased military spending and rhetoric about enlarging China’s role in the world.

The United States requires a viable strategy for addressing its legitimate grievances. Unfortunately, neither rage nor proclamation constitutes such a strategy. A viable approach would involve feasible objectives clearly conveyed and supported by carrots and sticks, along with a willingness to define and accept success.

At the heart of the problem in defining an economic strategy toward China is the following awkward fact: Suppose China had been fully compliant with every trade and investment rule and had been as open to the world as the most open countries at its income level. China might have grown faster because it reformed more rapidly, or it might have grown more slowly because of reduced subsidies or more foreign competition. But it is highly unlikely that its growth rate would have been altered by as much as 1 percent.

Equally, while some U.S. companies might earn more profits operating in China, and some job displacement in American manufacturing because of Chinese state subsidies may have occurred, it cannot be argued seriously that unfair Chinese trade practices have affected U.S. growth by even 0.1 percent a year.

This is not to say that China is not a threat to the international order. It is a seismic event for the United States to be overtaken after a century as the world’s largest economy. If, as is plausible though far from certain, the United States loses its lead over the next decade in information technology, artificial intelligence and biotech, the trauma will be magnified.

Can the United States imagine a viable global economic system in 2050 in which its economy is half the size of the world’s largest? Could a political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like? While it might be unacceptable to the United States to be so greatly surpassed in economic scale, does it have the means to stop it? Can China be held down without inviting conflict?

These are hard questions without obvious answers. But that is no excuse for ignoring them and focusing only on short-run frustrations. China appears to be willing to accommodate the United States on specific trade issues as long as the United States accepts its right to flourish and grow, knowing that sheer weight of numbers will make it the clear world’s largest economy before long.

That is a deal the United States should take while it can. It can bluster but it cannot, in an open world, suppress the Chinese economy. Trying to do so risks strengthening the most anti-American elements in Beijing.

Trump, for all his failings, has China’s attention on economic issues in a way that eluded his predecessors. The question is whether he will be able to use his leverage to accomplish something important. That will depend on his ability to convince the Chinese that the United States is capable of taking yes for an answer, and on his willingness to go beyond small-bore commercialism. We can hope, but we should not hold our breath.

December 5, 2018