PIIE: Inflation Relief from Trade Liberalization

Economic Club of New York with Glenn Hubbard

No Labels Conversation with Senator Pat Toomey

OMFIF

Inflation Debate between Paul R. Krugman and Lawrence H. Summers – Part II

On Friday, January 21, Paul R. Krugman & Lawrence H. Summers joined Markus’ Academy for another Debate on Inflation. Moderated by Markus Brunnermeier

University of Miami Herbert Business School

92 Street Y with Thane Rosenbaum

Ten Years Later: Reflections on the 2008–09 Financial Crisis

The Brookings Institute

January 10, 2019

 

Did we do right thing?

No. Then yes. Then no.

If you looked at what was happening to the economy in 2007, at the runup to Bear Stearns failing and what happened to after Bear Stearns failed, there was obviously a gathering storm. Nobody did much except react. Banks were allowed to continue paying dividends. Nobody was forced to recapitalize. The situation drifted along. There should have been shock and awe of capital, a recognition that maintaining demand was the most important objective of macro-economic policy. Yet nobody did much. It was an obvious mistake, even at the time.

But in the crucial period of six months between the time Lehman Brothers fell and the period after the stress test, America rose to the occasion. The banks were substantially recapitalized; significant fiscal stimulus was delivered; substantial interventions to provide liquidity to the financial markets were engineered; and the sharpest “V” in the history of the major economies was recorded between the first and second quarters of 2009. On the precipice of a truly historic economic calamity, we acted decisively, appropriately, and effectively. And this was by far the most important period to get it right.

By the end of 2009, however, driven by misguided concern about budget deficits and a desire to get to long-run agendas, we declared that the green shoots of recovery were at hand and left the battlefield. Demand was still too weak to drive a robust recovery, and as a consequence, the expansion was substantially slower than it could have been, with less capital investment and more people unemployed for a longer period of time. The lost output certainly cast a shadow forward.

So at the most important moment, we acted. But we waited too long and declared victory prematurely.

Could we have avoided a populist backlash?

There are reasons rooted in financial crises in general that serve as catalysts for populist uprisings: in particular the need to provide support to existing financial institutions, especially powerful ones, at the same time that masses of people suffer dislocation. But had we adopted more draconian policies towards the financial institutions, would it have somehow curbed the populist pressure? The best natural experiment says no. Britain nationalized two of their four major banks, yet they got “Brexited” at about the time that we got Trump.

Then there is the more extreme anti-establishment solution: the government simply stands back and allows businesses to fail. The economic fires burn themselves out, the theory goes, without taxpayers putting any money in. We have a natural experiment for that too, and it was what made the Great Depression great.

In fact, if you look at a graph of any interesting economic statistic from the beginning of the fall of 2008 to the beginning of 2009, it looks kind of just like the Great Depression did after 1929. And if you look at the subsequent five years, although our economy could have been better, it doesn’t look anything like the Depression. Unemployment peaked at 10 percent, not 25. Had we decided against government action, we would have had something like the Great Depression. And even in terms of the federal budget alone, the government would have lost 10 times as much revenue from the destruction of our economy as it would have gained from not having to spend money on bail outs—the vast majority of which came back to the government anyway.

Should we have nationalized banks?

When you nationalize an institution, the first question everyone asks is, “What happens next?” The situation is temporary, so how does it end?

Inside the bank, employees will generally make a fairly obvious calculation: If the government’s going to own and liquidate it, people who can find other jobs usually do. Talent leaves.

On the consumer side, debtors owing money to a bank that will never give them a new loan feel less pressure to pay back the old one. New customers give their business to banks that aren’t in liquidation and run by the government. For all these reasons our experience is that government intervention in banks is invariably a major destroyer of asset value. It would have been far more expensive for taxpayers had the government intervened in the banks. And those weaker banks would have been far less helpful in contributing to the recovery.

There were those who said at the time, “Well, what about the Swedish model?” But the Swedish government already owned 80 percent of the banks before the crisis started: The government putting additional capital into a bank that it already 80 percent owns really isn’t analogous to the situation we were facing. As for comparing this crisis to a standard intervention by the FTC, there certainly wasn’t anybody sitting around in the middle of the biggest financial crisis in 60 years ready to absorb a big bank as if it were a community bank.

Others simply say that banks didn’t suffer enough compared to everybody else. But if you were a shareholder in the banks that people talked about nationalizing, after we’ve had a 10-year recovery your investment is worth about 10 percent of what it was before the crisis started. To enact a harsher penalty, you would have had to destroy an enormous amount of value.

Is capitalism itself in crisis?

Many of the problems of capitalism are actually a feature of its success. It is a truism that middle-class wages have been stagnating. But we should remember how dramatically more efficient our economy has become. It takes takes about a third as many working hours to purchase a refrigerator as it did in 1973. It takes half as many hours to buy a shirt; one-sixth to buy a television. If you take the goods produced by what we think of as capitalism, there has been a massive increase in purchasing power over the last 45 years.

The challenge is how do we adapt to that increased efficiency, which is very much like what happened to agriculture. Agriculture has become so efficient that now it’s kind of irrelevant to the economy, less than two percent of our working population. And that what’s happening to traditional capitalist—particularly manufacturing—activity. Today in America only a four-and-a-half percent of workers are doing production work in manufacturing. There are more 50-year-old men on disability than doing production work in manufacturing—precisely because it’s become so productive. Fewer people are producing goods. More people are producing services.

What do we do in healthcare? What do we do in education? What do we do in housing? How do we handle social media? The difficulties and challenges come not from not the workings of capitalism but from the particular activities our workers move to as traditional capitalism succeeds. These are the economic policy challenges for the next generation. You can’t think about healthcare the way you think about the market for shirts. You can’t think about taking care of the aged the way you think about selling automobiles.

So is traditional capitalism enough? No. But rejecting traditional capitalism would not—if you look at places such as Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea—seem to be the answer either.  As for China, anyone who looks at it thoughtfully has to say that, for the most part, the reason China has done phenomenally well over the last 40 years is that there are a lot more markets, a lot more property, and a lot more openness to the rest of the world than there used to be. A broad rejection of capitalism is a poor substitute for taking on the real economic challenges that face the United States today.

 

Remembering Julio Rotemberg

Thank you very much to the organizers of this symposium for giving us all an opportunity to remember Julio Rotemberg and his many contributions and for giving me an opportunity to speak about a close friend who for me embodied the best in a scholarly life.  I cherished our friendship and so admired his example.

Start with this.  I knew Julio for a long time.  We met when he came to MIT as an assistant professor in 1980.  When his children were small, and I didn’t yet have children, I spent much time with him Annalise, Veronica and Martin.  With periods of more and less intensity Julio and I maintained our friendship for nearly 40 years.

In all that time, I never heard him say a petty or an envious or a nasty thing.  To be sure, he said things with which I disagreed but I never heard him gossip nastily, run down the work of another scholar, claim that he was being denied deserved credit for some contribution, suggest that someone was overrated or otherwise traffic in what is too often a large part of informal interaction among economists.  I suppose he must have had his ambitions but the only ones that I ever saw were to say things that were new and interesting and helped us understand the world better.

Another thing that stands out for me when I think about Julio was the generosity and capaciousness of his intellectual spirit.  He was not always right.  I am not sure that seeking to rehabilitate Latin American populism was a great impulse.  But there was no idea that he would not entertain, no hypothesis he would not consider, and no subject he would not address.  Over the years we discussed everything from the right maturity structure for US Treasury debt to how Harvard could procure more efficiently, from how committees could best make decisions to what history of thought economics graduate students should learn, from the physics of pumping a swing to the merits of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.

Julio gave me a great gift. If I thought a subject was interesting or I wanted to understand it better, that was enough.  He would turn his mind to the issue.  He would help me articulate the impulse that I had and then note the good reasons it was unlikely to be shared.  He was always smiling.  And one other thing stood out for me.  I have had my ups and downs over the years.  It did not affect one bit how Julio related to me.

Julio spent the last two decades of his life at the Harvard Business School.  He loved it and no aspect more than the case method.  I remember when I first became Harvard President, Julio invited me to participate in a class on Business and Government in the International Economy—the course he taught for many years.  The case under discussion addressed capital controls that Malaysia had imposed in the summer of 1998.  It had been written by Laura Alfaro who was then an assistant professor and referred to events I had been very involved in during my time at the Treasury.

I was outraged by the case.  From my perspective, the capital controls had enabled unjust imprisonment and beating of a Malaysian finance minister who had been my friend.  The controls who were imposed the day before my friend was fired and jailed so that his imprisonment couldn’t lead to capital outflows and economic instability.  It seemed to me that this was an unjust totalitarian act that should not be dignified by academic debate.

Julio responded in two ways.  First, with uncharacteristic sternness he said to me: “Larry, you can yell me at me as much as loud and as long as you want.  But Laura is an assistant professor without tenure here and you are President of the University so you are not going to attack her work.”  He then continued:  “You have just the reaction I hoped you would have.  The Malaysians think the case is way unfair to their perspective.  If both sides are mad, that means we wrote a great case.”

He was right on both counts.

His devotion to his teaching was never as clear as in the last weeks of his life. He knew his remaining time was short and there was nothing he wanted to do more than to spend time with his family, and to write one last case and teach one last course.  Thanks to Rafael Di Tella, he was able to teach a that last course.  And he finished the case—attacking my views on the need for more infrastructure investment in the US.  I learned from what he wrote, even if I was not totally persuaded.  And I so admired the way even when in obvious pain, he pushed me to articulate my argument as clearly as possible so he could refute it in its best version.

Julio was a wonderful scholar.  But he was an even better husband, father and friend.  I have so many fond memories of time with Julio and Annalise.  In the early years, my wife and I used to go skiing with the Julio and Annalise.  That does not exactly capture it.  More accurate would be to say we purchased lift tickets at the same resort.  We would then “ski together” which meant we would identify a run to be traversed.  Julio and Annalise would cover the ground three times on the steepest descent while I would struggle down the long crisscrossing horizontal way.  Julio was never impatient or frustrated just mildly amused.

Then there was hiking where I lived in terror at the slopes he would get me on.  I used to remind him that I hiked with my legs not with my hands and that if a trail required the use of hands, it was not for me.  He would always agree and then choose a trail that was just hard enough that I have two moments of terror and cursing on the way up and down and then a real sense of satisfaction afterwards.

And he was so devoted to his children.  I remember his saying to me a couple of years ago.  “Martin has six great ideas.  It would be so great if he could finish and write up at least one of them.  But I can’t say that to him.  Can you?”  I was happy to try to help.

Julio Rotemberg was as good a man as I have known.  I will always miss my friend, even as I am sustained by his memory.

Speech to the Economic Club of New York

Summers spoke to the Economic Club of New York on May 16, 2018. Watch the video here:

Dana Farber’s Joint Visiting Committee Symposium

 

The most important thing that a philanthropist can do is set off a chain that leads to an extraordinary discovery.

There is no risk, none, that we will over invest, over care or overdue it with respect to solving these problems. What does that mean? It means that all of us have to worry not about the mistakes we make but about the things we do not do, the opportunities that we miss.  All of us have to be prepared to take risks and bet on young genius.

This century will be a century about victory against disease, success in limiting pain and suffering, large scale extension of life and substantial augmentation of human capability.  And it is probably going to be the best thing to happen to mankind.

In 15th century Florence was not the biggest or richest city in the world but most important city in the world because of what human minds in Florence were doing.  What they were doing artistically, culturally and scientifically with respect to what was most important to human thought at that time.  I would say that Boston has exactly that potential right now because if you draw a circle with a six mile radius from where right where we are now, you have more life science talent within that circle by a factor of 2, than in any comparable 6 mile circle on this planet and its most important thing that’s happening for humanity.

I said something in my inaugural address as President of Harvard: We will take risks, we will fail many times because the greatest failure would be if we never had any failures because that would mean we had not taken the risks that the challenges of the moment demand.  All of your who are involved in supporting research, allocating research dollars need to make sure that you are taking risks, that  you are gambling on the things that could change the world.

My story of late stage cancer makes the point that cancer doesn’t need to define you and won’t define your life.  And with work you are doing here, it won’t define or end the life of the large majority of people who experience it. That, based on my own experience, is a hugely important thing.

Central Bank Independence

I am very sorry that a recently arising family commitment makes it impossible for me to be with you in person.  Becoming independent for a central bank is I suppose like going off to college for a young person—a moment of validation, maturation and new adventure.  The Bank of England’s performance since becoming independent 20 years ago has in many, if not all ways, borne out the hope of those like me who strongly supported independence.  There is much to celebrate.

Read more

Kenneth Arrow Commemoration at the Institute for Advanced Studies

Tel Aviv, Jerusalem
July 5, 2017

I should say that there are many things I wish for in life. One of them is that I had the capacity for abstraction to follow the typical lecture at this remarkable seminar, which I know has done so much to shape so many careers and has meant so much to Kenneth. From discussions of gridlock in democratic countries, to issues of health insurance, to debates about how to discount the future benefits of environmental projects, to issues around derivatives markets, we see every day that albeit with long and variable lags, abstract economic theory moves the world.

I do not need to tell this group of Kenneth’s genius. You’ve all heard the stories of him, apparently asleep, waking up to ask exactly the right question in the middle of a seminar. You’ve all heard the story of the group of assistant professors that were tired of him knowing everything, and, so found an obscure issue of National Geographic on the sounds that dolphins make to communicate with each other and drove the conversation to that topic, figuring this would be a topic that they knew more about than Kenneth. Kenneth proceeded to explain that National Geographic had described a superseded theory, and that the most recent work in the area explained that what the assistant professors were saying was wrong.

I witnessed one of these moments at our annual family Thanksgiving in Philadelphia. We took the kids to see Independence Hall–that’s a relatively standard site when visiting the city. On the ride back, Kenneth recited the entire Declaration of Independence from memory. Later on that same trip, my wife Lisa, who’s a Professor of American Poetry at Harvard, found herself in conversation with Kenneth. They were discussing Emily Dickinson, who Lisa was writing about at that stage. Kenneth asked Lisa which of the two then recent biographies of the poet she felt had captured her better and discussed at length their respective merits.

Those stories could be multiplied, but one wonders when one thinks about genius, what other human qualities go along with it? I thought my comparative advantage might be commenting on a few aspects of Kenneth’s life that I think were inseparable from, but not the same as, his genius.

First, Kenneth the child: I didn’t know Kenneth, obviously, as a child, but I’ve heard many stories from my mother and two features of those stories stand out. One, that for someone so brilliant, he was extraordinarily patient and gentle in teaching his younger siblings about anything they wanted to know. When his ten-year-old sister, four years younger than he, inquired of Kenneth, “What exactly does the phrase, ‘make love’ mean?,” Kenneth found an appropriate and judicious answer. As I’ve heard it described, roughly speaking, as a child Kenneth did nothing wrong. This was good because there was the problem of how you punish a child like Kenneth. How do you punish normal children? You send them to their room. Well, there was no activity Kenneth liked better than being in his room, reading. Far, far better than trying to play baseball, or sitting outside on a hot day. What could be better than sitting in his room and reading? And he read and he read.

Second, Kenneth the teacher. Many have already referred to Kenneth as a teacher. As best I can tell, the only athletic ability at which Kenneth excelled was tossing a piece of chalk in the air and catching it. I experienced, when David and Andy were young, playing various ball games with Kenneth. I can reliably report that he was not able to catch a ball thrown from a distance of more than six feet, but with chalk he was excellent. For the right students, Kenneth was as good a teacher as there has ever been. But Kenneth had a real problem as a teacher, which is that he didn’t really think like the rest of us. From his Olympian perspective, it was very difficult to understand what students did and did not understand.

A story is told—and I’m not sure it’s true, but it’s a good story–that in the year that I was in Kenneth’s microeconomic theory graduate course, nobody was in any doubt about the profundity of what we were being exposed to, but there was some group in the class that was having substantial difficulty discerning the main points. So, a group of students very politely and humbly approached Kenneth and said, perhaps, he could work at explaining definitions and explaining terms, and just being a little more clear so people could follow the lecture. At the next lecture, very sweetly and innocently, Kenneth wrote, f(x) on the board, and he explained what f(x) means: a function. A function is something that maps one variable into another.

Now, if I had done something like that, it would have been because I was being sarcastic. If others had done that, it likely would have been because they were making a point about students needing to keep up or their frustration about students’ slowness. Kenneth was utterly sincere and in good faith. From his perspective, the Slutsky equation and the meaning of a function were equally elementary concepts.

Not everything Kenneth did succeeded. There was a movement in the Harvard Economics Department in the early ‘70s (this is an experiment that has not been repeated as best I know in the last 45 years) to assure that faculty rather than graduate students would teach introductory economics to college freshmen. This was accomplished in two ways: one is assistant professors were required to teach introductory economics, and the other is that generous souls were prevailed on. Kenneth was a generous soul and he was prevailed on. So, for a full year Kenneth was the teaching fellow for 24 fortunate freshmen. He reported afterwards, and I fear data confirms this, that he had not been quite able to find their level, and of 24 teaching fellows that year, he had been ranked 13th. The experiment was not repeated.

Third, Kenneth’s insatiable intellectual curiosity: You don’t become a prodigious contributor to a discipline like Kenneth, with the kind of insights that Kenneth offered us, without a certain extraordinary intellectual intensity. I remember the fall night in 1972, after Kenneth was awarded the Nobel Prize. The other American Nobel Prize winner at that moment, Paul Samuelson, also my uncle, hosted a party for Kenneth and the Cambridge economics community. I was a sophomore economics major at MIT, so I was hardly appropriate company for such an august gathering, but I was a little unique in being related to both the host and the honoree, so I was invited and I participated as best I could in the conversation. I have only one enduring impression of that evening, which is that seven o’clock, became eight o’clock, became nine o’clock, and then approached ten o’clock. Almost everybody left, and Paul and Kenneth were discussing turnpike theorems. Kenneth was discussing aspects of the Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Paul was discussing how stupid Joan Robinson was. Those of you who are old enough will really get this. And they were discussing the turnpike theorem, and the maximum principle, and the Hamiltonian and whatever. My aunt Marion, Paul’s wife, went upstairs. The caterers finished cleaning and left. Selma had her very heavy winter coat and looked on impatiently. I was waiting for my ride back to Cambridge Kenneth and Paul were still discussing the theorems. Until they got it straight, that discussion was not going to end. It made an impression on me that I never forgot. There were two people in that room who wanted to discuss economics for the longest period of time, with the least regard for social exigencies. And those were the two people in that room who had won the Nobel Prize.

Fourth, Kenneth and public policy. Some of you probably don’t know this, but Kenneth was proud of having been integral to the first cost benefit analysis of the US SST (Super Sonic Transit) proposal during his time on the staff of President Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisers. He had the right to be proud as his analysis was part of the reason that the United States did not join Britain and France in their costly SST error.

Kenneth followed many, many aspects of public policy, closely. The two Americans who, in my experience, were able to discuss Israel’s dozen or so political parties with the most nuance were Bill Clinton and Kenneth Arrow. He would, each year at Thanksgiving, review with Eytan Sheshinski the progress of each of Israel’s political parties. While it was enough for me to get a sense of how the good guys were doing, Kenneth was on top of every twist and turn.

I think there was only one moment in the 62 years of my being Kenneth’s nephew, when we were seriously annoyed with each other, and I don’t actually know now which of us was right. In the summer of 1996, when I was in charge of international financial policy for the Clinton Administration, Boris Yeltsin was running for reelection against Zyuganov who was the full-fledged revanchist, the “return to the old way” Communist. Privatizations had taken place and were continuing. As history has recorded, the privatizations were not entirely legitimate, to put it mildly, and had substantial elements of unjust enrichment. It bears emphasis that some of the enterprises being privatized were being stolen from their state managers, so there was a reasonable argument that at least having some owner, even an illegitimate one, would improve the way in which they were being managed. The United States government, while not supporting the details of the privatization, was working very hard to support Boris Yeltsin against the Communist, and to support the idea of economic reform in Russia.

Just before the election Kenneth signed a letter, along with a group of pre-perestroika, pre-glasnost Soviet economists condemning the economic policies of the Yeltsin administration. It got enormous play in Russia. I thought it was an irresponsible and politically naïve act to intervene in a way that would predictably favor the communist without checking with the US government. He thought that I was losing my proper focus on what the right economic policy should be, in order to serve the political objective of the government. My poor mother had to hear my view of Kenneth’s actions and Kenneth’s view of my views. Fortunately, there were months that passed before Thanksgiving.

Five years ago I was involved in forming a commission of various former officials and scholars on global health. Dean Jamison, who is a former student of Kenneth’s, and was my collaborator in this venture, asked whether we should have Kenneth join. I said, “No, he’s 89 years old. The commission’s going to meet in Oslo. The commission’s going to meet in Addis Ababa. Who knows where this commission is going to meet? This is surely not what he wants to be doing at this stage in life. I don’t think that really makes sense.” And Dean said, “Really??” I thought about it and I decided that consumer sovereignty was a good principle in which Kenneth believed, and so I worked very hard to figure out a way of asking him whether he’d be interested in doing it, that was designed to make “no” as easy an answer for him as possible. Kenneth said, “Yes, absolutely, I’d be happy to do it. And just one more thing, as I’m approaching my 90th birthday, I probably won’t be able to write a section of the report myself.” And I said, “That will be okay.” I can report in a style that I do not think has been passed onto the next generation of academics, Kenneth joined the commission before learning that it would be possible to fly business class to its meetings. He would have been wholly prepared to fly coach, if that is something that had been requested.

Fifth, Kenneth, the person: One of the things that has never stopped impressing me about Kenneth was that while he was obviously extraordinary and he was obviously treated by people, like the people in this room and so many others, as extraordinary, he never had a sense of himself as special. I remember many, many years ago, probably 35 or 40 years ago, the American Economic Association, for some reason, had its meeting in Atlantic City. Atlantic City is about an hour, maybe an hour-and-a-quarter from Philadelphia, and after the meeting Kenneth was coming to my parents’ home. There are many ways one could make the journey. Kenneth went to the Atlantic City bus terminal, got on the bus, rode the bus to Philadelphia, and wanted to be picked up at the bus terminal. My mother explained, “You know, you were given a fair amount of money, we read in the paper a few years ago, when you won the Nobel prize. There are taxis, there are limos, there are many Penn faculty who, undoubtedly, would have been delighted to give you a ride in order to spend an hour with you. Did you really need to take the bus?” He said, “Oh, really? I guess I could have done those things but I never really thought of anything else.”

This was something that ran very deep. Four or five years ago, Kenneth found himself in Stanford Hospital needing surgery, and there were different surgical options. For whatever reason, the process of finding the way to the right option was not happening in an especially effective and efficient way. My mother and I said to Kenneth, “Kenneth, you know, you are not just any patient at the hospital of Stanford University. You have devoted much of your life to Stanford University and you are, perhaps, the most distinguished person associated with Stanford University. They really should take care of you and they should see you quickly, not slowly.” Kenneth said, “Really? Well, what should we do?” And I said, “Well, just kind of make it clear.” And it was clear that he didn’t really quite know what I meant, or how to do it. I asked, “Would it be okay if I made a couple of phone calls?” And he said, “Yeah, I suppose, if you want to.” The appropriate things then started to happen.

A final example of this, just slightly ethereal quality: I remember being in a conversation, with Kenneth and Selma in their kitchen in Cambridge, many years ago. We were discussing annuities. We were having a highly-animated conversation about intemporally separable utility, the nature of the bequest motive, risk aversion, adverse selection and whether purchasing annuities was optimal. A group of economic theorists like those here can more or less imagine all the propositions. Selma didn’t really find the conversation very interesting, but said, “Well, wait a minute, annuities? , We’re approaching retirement. Do we have our plan?” And Kenneth said, “Oh, I don’t know. Whatever, it will work itself out. It will work itself out in some reasonable way.”

Finally, Kenneth as an uncle and as a great uncle: If there’s a lot of ruin in a nation, there’s a fair amount of ignorant assertion in a family of 17, with many young persons present. I have never heard Kenneth treat a comment other than utterly seriously. If a nine year old or a twelve year old was trying to figure out whether it was true, false, or sometimes that all equilateral triangles are isosceles, he was prepared to devote himself to that question with the same thoughtful seriousness that he was prepared to devote himself to questions of mechanism design or the limits of information. If an opinion was being expressed about gambling or football betting, he was prepared to devote himself to at least the quantitative aspects of the betting, if not the content of the sport, in the same way that he would devote himself to the Savage axioms of risk and utility theory. He was there for everyone, expecting nothing in return, and, therefore, for his family, as for all of us here, he made us feel like we were smarter, more noble, and better than we actually were.

I miss him today, and the world will miss him always. Rest in peace, gentle genius.