Archive for category: Commentary

The covid-19 chapter in U.S. economic history is coming to a close more rapidly than almost anyone expected, including me. Within weeks, gross domestic product will reach a new peak, and it is likely to exceed its pre-covid trend line before year’s end, as the economy enjoys its fastest year of growth in decades. Job openings are at record levels, and unemployment may well fall below 4 percent in the next 12 months. Wages and productivity growth are increasing.

This is both very good news and a tribute to the aggressive covid-19 containment policies of recent months, as well as to strong fiscal and monetary policies since the onset of the pandemic. Our economy has outperformed those of other industrial countries. U.S. policymakers can take satisfaction from that.

But new conditions require new approaches. Now, the primary risk to the U.S. economy is overheating — and inflation.

Even six months ago, it was reasonable to regard slow growth, high unemployment and deflationary pressures as the predominant risk to the economy. Today, while continuing relief efforts are essential, the focus of our macroeconomic policy needs to change.

Inflationary pressures are mounting from the boost in demand created by the $2 trillion-plus in savings that Americans have accumulated during the pandemic; from large-scale Federal Reserve debt purchases, along with Fed forecasts of essentially zero interest rates into 2024; from roughly $3 trillion in fiscal stimulus passed by Congress; and from soaring stock and real estate prices.

This is not just conjecture. The consumer price index rose at a 7.5 percent annual rate in the first quarter, and inflation expectations jumped at the fastest rate since inflation indexed bonds were introduced a generation ago. Already, consumer prices have risen almost as much as the Fed predicted for the whole year.

“We are seeing very substantial inflation,” Warren Buffett recently observed in remarks typical of business leaders throughout the country. “We are raising prices. People are raising prices to us, and it’s being accepted.”

Fed and Biden administration officials are entirely correct in pointing out that some of that inflation, such as last month’s run-up in used-car prices, is transitory. But not everything we are seeing is likely to be temporary. A variety of factors suggests that inflation may yet accelerate — including further price pressures as demand growth outstrips supply growth; rising materials costs and diminished inventories; higher home prices that have so far not been reflected at all in official price indexes; and the impact of inflation expectations on purchasing behavior.

Higher minimum wages, strengthened unions, increased employee benefits and strengthened regulation are all desirable, but they, too, all push up business costs and prices.

It is possible that the Fed could contain inflationary pressures by raising interest rates without damaging the economy. But in the current environment, where markets around the world have been primed to believe that rates will remain very low for the foreseeable future, that will be very difficult, especially given the Fed’s new commitment to wait until sustained inflation is apparent before acting. The history here is not encouraging. Every time the Fed has hit the brakes hard enough to slow growth meaningfully, the economy has gone into recession.

How much does it matter whether inflation accelerates? In general, increases in inflation disproportionately hurt the poor and are associated with reductions in trust in government. Progressives might consider the role that inflation played in electing Richard M. Nixon in 1968 and Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Jason Furman, chairman of President Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, recently said that the American Rescue Plan is definitely “too big for the moment,” stating: “I don’t know of any economist that was recommending something the size of what was done.” Excessive stimulus driven by political considerations was a consequential policy error that would be tragically compounded if valid concerns about the economy overheating prevented Congress from making the types of necessary public investments that are the focus of President Biden’s Jobs and Families Plans.

So how best can we contain overheating risks and promote sustainable growth while also making necessary investments in infrastructure, greening the economy and helping low- and middle-income families?

First, starting at the Fed, policymakers need to help contain inflation expectations and reduce the risk of a major contractionary shock by explicitly recognizing that overheating, and not excessive slack, is the predominant near-term risk for the economy. Tightening is likely to be necessary, and it is critical to set the stage for that delicate process. Meanwhile, the administration needs to continue to respect the independence of the Fed as it changes course. Clear statements that the United States desires a strong dollar will also be helpful in anchoring inflation expectations.

Second, policies toward workers should be aimed at the labor shortage that is our current reality. Unemployment benefits enabling workers to earn more by not working than working should surely be allowed to run out in September; in some parts of the country they should end sooner. Re-employment bonuses should be considered, and a major focus should be on promoting mobility and training workers for occupations where labor is short. Where “made-in-America” requirements exacerbate labor shortages and raise prices, they should be reconsidered.

Third, it is essential to make long-term public investments to increase productivity and enable more people to work. It would be a grave error to cut back excessively on public-investment ambitions out of inflation concerns. That is not because of the immediate jobs they create, but because of the long-term increases they generate in productive potential, sustainability and inclusivity. But where possible, infrastructure investments should be financed by reprogramming of Rescue Plan funds, such as those now being used by some states to finance tax cuts. Additionally, current spending financed by future taxes might further stimulate an already overheated economy. The opposite — revenue increases ahead of spending, or at least parallel to spending — can ensure more sustainable growth.

The winding down of the covid-19 crisis provides a historic opportunity for taking the next step toward providing for all Americans in an ever more effective and inclusive way. But to avoid squandering the opportunity, policymakers need to accept economic reality. The moment has come to move past emergency policies and fight for our country’s long-term future.

President Biden’s $1.9 trillion covid-19 relief plan, added to the stimulus measure Congress passed in December with the incoming administration’s strong support, would represent the boldest act of macroeconomic stabilization policy in U.S. history. Its ambition, its rejection of austerity orthodoxy and its commitment to reducing economic inequality are all admirable. It is imperative that safety-net measures for those suffering and investments in vaccination and testing be undertaken rapidly after the indefensible delays of the last months of the Trump administration.  READ MORE

By Lawrence H. Summers and Anna Stansbury

Covid-19 has brought into sharp relief the contrast between the experiences of the higher-income Americans who receive deliveries and the lower-income Americans who fulfill them, between those who can work safely from home and those who must expose themselves to risk, often with inadequate protection, between those who have the power to safeguard their health and their living standards and those who do not. More broadly, it has highlighted the long-standing trends in the U.S. economy toward a falling labor share of income, rising income inequality and slow wage growth for most workers — even as corporate stock market valuations and profitability rise.

Economic analysis often ascribes these trends to some combination of globalization, technological change and rising monopoly power. But our research suggests that a more compelling explanation is the broad-based decline in worker power. As workers have become less able to share in the profits generated by their firms, income has been redistributed from employees to the owners of capital. That has contributed to higher income inequality along class and race lines.

The evisceration of private-sector unions is the most obvious example of the decline in worker power. At the peak, one-third of the private-sector workforce belonged to a union; that number is now 6 percent. But other factors also affect the degree to which workers can share in firms’ profits. Because of increased shareholder activism, rising levels of debt, increases in private equity and changing corporate norms, businesses are increasingly run for shareholders rather than their stakeholders. Ruthless management tactics involving precise measurement of workers’ day-to-day activity have become widespread.

Meanwhile, workers at large firms or in highly paid industries (such as manufacturing, construction or transportation) used to earn large wage advantages, as they shared in the profits generated by their companies, but these benefits have declined by half since the early 1980s. An increasing number of workers are outsourced domestically, employed by staffing or temp agencies or misclassified as independent contractors, reducing their ability to share in the profits of the main firm they work for. And the real value of the minimum wage is lower than it was in the 1970s.

Why did this happen? Some portion of the decline in worker power may have been an inevitable outcome of globalization or technological change. But our research — which examines shifts in labor shares and corporate profits across different industries — indicates that changes in policy, norms and institutions are the most important explanatory factors. This view is supported by the fact that the legal and political environment has been tilted substantially in favor of shareholders and against workers since the 1980s, a trend exemplified by the expansion of state right-to-work laws undermining unions’ ability to fund themselves and the increasing corporate use of union avoidance tactics, both legal and illegal. The fact that the decline in unionization, the rise in income inequality and the fall in labor’s share of income have all happened to a greater extent in the United States than in much of the rest of the industrialized world also suggests an important role for U.S.-specific explanations.

What should be done? A traditional economic argument is that policy should let markets function competitively and then rely on progressive taxation and spending to redistribute income afterward. It is this kind of thinking that lies behind advocacy of negative income taxes or, more recently, for a universal basic income. But progressive institutionalists have long argued for pre-distribution alongside redistribution, strengthening worker power by changing the structure of labor market institutions.

We believe both ingredients are required. Strengthening worker power can be an important countervailing force against firms’ dominance in product and labor markets, as argued famously by John Kenneth Galbraith. And it’s not necessarily the case that it is more efficient to reduce inequality through after-the-fact transfers and taxes than by strengthening unions beforehand. After all, taxes create distortions and alter incentives — and moving to a system with more centralized bargaining may actually reduce the distortionary effects of taxation. When something is a big problem — as is inequality in America today — it is appropriate to tackle it from multiple angles.

Of course, there is a risk that by raising wages, such policies might lead to an increase in unemployment. Indeed, our research suggests that the decline in worker power may have contributed to the long-term decline in average U.S. unemployment (until the current crisis). The risk of increased unemployment should not be dismissed lightly, particularly as unemployment disproportionately affects lower-income people and people of color. But it is possible to bolster the power of labor without excessively restricting hiring. There is reason to believe, for example, that allowing bargaining at a broader level than just the individual firm — such as sectoral collective bargaining — would reduce the negative effects of unionization on unemployment. We must also consider the type of unemployment that policies might create; an increase in short-term unemployment as workers spend more time searching for good jobs is less problematic than the development of a two-tier labor market where unprotected “outsiders” spend long periods in unemployment or are unable to access good jobs at all.

Overall, we believe that increasing worker power must be a central and urgent priority for policymakers concerned with inequality, low pay and poor work conditions. If we do not shift the distribution of power toward workers, any other policy changes are likely to be short-term and insufficient.